Regulation, governance and the role of the informal sector in influencing environmental quality? by Bali Swain, Ranjula et al.
Regulation, governance and the role of 




Creative Commons: Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 
Bali Swain, R., Kambhampati, U. and Karimu, A. (2020) 
Regulation, governance and the role of the informal sector in 
influencing environmental quality? Ecological Economics, 173. 
106649. ISSN 0921-8009 doi: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106649 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/89332/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work.  See Guidance on citing .
To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2020.106649 
Publisher: Elsevier 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
1  
 







We investigate the effect of the informal sector and a range of governance indicators on both 
global and local pollutants for a panel of 58 countries during 1996-2011. The analysis employs a 
fixed effects-instrumental variable generalized method of moments approach. We find that the 
size of the informal sector has a significant impact on environmental quality, which is conditional 
on the level of economic development. For developing countries, the informal sector has a 
significant positive impact on local pollutants, whereas for the developed countries the informal 
sector has a significantly negative effect on global pollutants. The findings also reveal that the 
impact of governance depends on the type of governance measure, the level of economic 
development and type of pollutant. Control of corruption emerges as the single most important 
factor especially in the non-OECD countries in improving environmental quality. We argue that 
the efficacy of an environmental policy for a country with a large informal sector will be low if 
the policy measures do not address governance, size of the informal sector and environmental 
policy targets. 
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Much of the existing literature on the determinants of environmental quality is framed within the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) framework.1 While the EKC itself is a stripped-down 
inverted- U relationship between various indicators of environmental quality and economic 
growth, recent work has extended the model to include wider determinants of environmental 
quality. Empirical estimation of the EKC has recognised that in a reduced form model, income 
acts as a proxy for too many other determinants (for instance, level of economic activity, structure 
of the economy, regulatory capability etc.), thus leading to an omitted variable(s) bias. This 
recognition led to attempts to extend the model by including variables relating to the structure of 
the economy, energy prices, trade openness and occasionally political rights and civil liberties. 
 
In this paper, we analyse the impact of regulation and governance (or more precisely, lack of 
regulation and governance) and the informal sector on environmental quality. To date, most 
studies that have analysed the impact of institutions have concentrated on political rights and civil 
liberties (Congleton, 1992; Farzin and Bond, 2006; Bernauer and Koubi, 2009; You et al., 2015). 
We argue that political rights and civil liberties variables themselves are reduced form versions 
of variables like regulatory quality, voice and accountability and the rule of law that are more 
appropriate in this context. In this paper therefore, we consider the impact of regulation from two 
angles. First, we include the size of the informal sector as a proxy for the level of regulation and 
governance that an economy experiences. The larger the informal sector, the less regulated is the 
economic activity in the economy. It is worth caveating this contention by acknowledging that 
the informal sector is likely to operate under a range of non-state norms and conventions which 
will influence behavior and yield accountability. These conventions and norms are likely to vary 
across countries and communities. However, for the purposes of the analysis in this paper, our 
concern is with the impact that formal rules and regulations imposed by the state may have on 
economic activity and environmental quality. Our second measure of regulation and governance 
therefore relates to more direct measures of such governance – control of corruption, political 
stability, government effectiveness and voice and accountability. The informal sector is, by 
definition, the sector with a minimum of formal  regulations and governance. The 15th 
 
1 Kuznets (1955) hypothesized that during the earlier stages of economic growth income inequality increases while 
declining in the later stages of development. This gave an inverted U-shaped relationship between the income per 
capita and income inequality. A similar inverted U-shaped relationship was believed to exist between the income per 
capita and the environmental degradation and was termed the Environmental Kuznets Curve by Panayotou (1993). 
Grossman and Krueger (1991), Shafik and Bandyopadhyay (1992) and Panatayou (1993) were amongst the first set 
of empirical EKC studies. 
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International Conference of Labour Statisticians (in 1993) at the International  Labour 
Organisation (ILO),  defined the informal sector as a group of production units comprised of 
unincorporated enterprises that are owned by households, including informal own-account 
enterprises and the enterprises of informal employers. These may include street vendors, 
manufacturing and repair sweat shops etc. If the informal sector has a positive impact on 
emissions, then we might conclude that the lack of government regulation allows this sector to 
pollute more than the formal sector. Also, it is possible that the lack of regulation or the avoidance 
of existing regulation (through, for instance, outsourcing) causes the activities to shift from the 
formal (more regulated) sector to the informal (less regulated) sector. 
 
It is clear that there are many kinds of pollutants, which vary in their sources, their dispersion as 
well as their impact. Thus, some pollutants are related only to agriculture, while others are related 
to the use of carbon-fuel in industry. Pollutants can be local or global. Some pollutants have a 
very long lifetime in the environment while others are more short-lived. We therefore analyse the 
emissions of a range of pollutants including carbon-dioxide (CO2) per capita, CO2 per unit of 
energy use (carbon intensity), organic and chemical water pollutants per worker and the 
ecological footprint bringing together data from the UN Environment Programme, the World 
Bank (2012) and Schneider et al. (2010). 
 
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, while many papers [Farzin and 
Bond (2006); Torras and Boyce (1998)] have looked at the impact of political rights and civil 
liberties on environmental quality, they have concentrated on broad democracy and other political 
rights indicators. They have also tended to create a single index (Bhattarai and Hammig, 2001), 
which has meant that they are unable to identify which aspects of regulation and governance are 
most crucial to environmental quality. Using data made available by the World Bank (2012) on 
governance across countries, we are able to investigate the impact of specific aspects of 
governance on decreasing emissions. Second, the paper systematically analyses the role of the 
informal sector in influencing environmental quality. The few studies that consider the impact of  
informal economic activity on local pollutants rely on specific case studies and concentrate on 
local pollutants. Research on the wider environmental impact of the informal sector (both 
geographically as well as across a range of pollutants) is very limited. Analysing the impact both 
of the informal sector as well as governance allows us to comprehensively consider the role that 
lack of governance plays in environmental problems. Finally, we test a range of methodologies 
(appropriate for panel data), which correct for endogeneity as well as cross-country 
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heterogeneities, problems that are common in analyses of environmental quality. Key findings 
from our study indicate that, in general the informal sector positively influences the emission of 
local pollutants but has no impact on global pollutants such as CO2  per capita and CO2 intensity 
in our sample of 58 Countries. Moreover, the effect of the informal sector also depends on the 
level of development. It is associated with lower global emissions for developed countries though 
it has no significant effect on global pollutants in developing countries. The study also finds that 
the control of corruption and political stability are highly significant governance measures in 
determining environmental quality in developing countries. 
 
In what follows, we will review the literature before moving on to discuss the data and 
methodology in Section 3 and the results in Section 4. The summary and conclusions are 
discussed in the final section. 
  
2. Literature  Review 
 
A large proportion of the literature on environmental quality is embedded within the EKC 
framework (Grossman and Krueger, 1991, 1995; Shafik and Bandyopadhyay, 1992; World Bank, 
1992; Panatayou, 1993; see Dinda, 2004 for a survey).2 This is not surprising because the EKC 
provides a convenient and easy to use framework with an intuitive foundation – the relationship 
between economic activity and environmental quality. This has become especially important in 
recent years due to the concerns relating to increasing global pollution levels while at the same 
time there is an acceptance of the need to reduce global poverty via accelerated economic growth. 
Based on various assumptions the EKC relationship between environmental quality and income 
can be obtained theoretically (John and Pecchenino, 1994; Selden and Song, 1995; Stokey, 1998; 
Dinda and Coondoo, 2002). The EKC can be derived from the technological link between 
consumption of a desired good and abatement of the 'bad' produced as a by-product (Andreoni 
and Levinson, 2001) or the marginal cost and marginal benefit (Munasinghe, 1999). Lopez (1994) 
argues that income growth is driven by the accumulation of production factors, which also lead 
to an increase in firms' demand for polluting inputs. At the same time, this income growth leads 
to an increase in the demand for environmental quality as well as an increase in the willingness 
to pay for a clean environment increases.  
 
2 Some researchers argue that increase in environmental deterioration is transient and with greater economic growth, 
environmental quality will improve (Beckerman, 1992; Bhagwati, 1993; Barlett, 1994; Lomborg, 2001). Others insist that 
trade liberalization re-distributes pollution from rich countries to poor countries, as the pollution-intensive industries 
move to developing countries (Suri and Chapman, 1998; Ekins 1997). Arrow et al., 1995 believe that economic growth is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient factor to induce environmental improvement. 
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Despite having spawned a large literature, the framework has been criticised because its reduced-
form implies that there is a potential for bias arising from variables omitted from the model 
(Galeotti et al., 2009) and also because the model does not provide much policy-relevant 
information. Thus, for instance, what is one to conclude if emissions from a particular pollutant 
have an inverted-U shape? We can derive the turning point but only for the sample of countries 
in that study. We cannot generalise from this sample to all countries, in particular because there 
is a range of variables that could help to shift the EKC and therefore its turning point. 
 
EKC empirical studies have recognised that in such a reduced form model, income proxies for 
several other determinants, for example, the level of economic activity, structure of the economy, 
regulatory capability as well as incentives (Stern 2004, 2007; Dijkgraaf and Vollebergh, 1998, 
2005; Holtz-Eakin and Selden and Song, 1995; Richmond and Kaufmann, 2006; Muller-
Furstenberger and Wagner, 2007; He, 2007; Hossain, 2011). In recent years, therefore, more 
attention has been paid to factors (other than income) which influence pollutant emissions. These 
include the structure of the economy, energy prices, trade openness and occasionally political 
rights and civil liberties (Dasgupta and Maler, 1995; Barrett, 2000; Barrett and Graddy, 2000; 
Harbaugh et al., 2002; Narayan and Narayan, 2010). Several studies emphasise that formal and 
informal regulations and enforcement improve environmental quality (Pargal and Wheeler, 1996; 
Panayotou, 1999; Hettige et al., 2000; Dasgupta et al., 2002). In particular, Dasgupta et al., (1995) 
argue that waiting for the turning point in the EKC to deliver better environmental results is 
foolish. It assumes that incentives and regulations only change when income increases. However, 
it is possible for direct action to improve regulations and therefore hasten the EKC turning point. 
To test this, Dasgupta et al., (1995) use the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment for Environment (CPIAE) data. They find that poor governance and geographical 
vulnerability account for very high levels of pollution in many developing country cities and 
therefore conclude that policy reform is necessary to improve environmental quality in these 
countries. Barrett (2000) finds that an increase in civil and political freedoms decreases some 
pollutants (including suspended particulates). This finding is also confirmed by Harbaugh, 
Levinson and Wilson (2000) who find a significantly negative association between suspended 
particulates in the air and a measure of democratic participation. 
 
Leitao (2010) analyses the impact of corruption on sulphur emissions using data from the 
International Country Risk Guide for corruption. He concludes that corruption shifts the turning 
point of the EKC to the right i.e. prevents emissions from decreasing earlier. Farzin and Bond 
6  
(2006) find that democracy and its associated freedoms provide the conduit through which agents 
can exercise their preferences for improved environmental quality. These results confirm those 
from earlier studies that greater political rights and civil liberties would improve environmental 
quality (Torras and Boyce, 1998) or that secure property rights and better enforcement of 
contracts help flatten out the EKC and decrease the environmental cost of economic growth 
(Panayatou, 1997). Bhattarai and Hammig (2001) using an index of 12 political rights and 7 civil 
liberties find that better institutions decrease de-forestation in Africa and Latin America but not 
in Asia. 
 
Beyond the EKC framework, there are theories proposed to directly and formally provide the 
dynamics of the economic growth-environmental quality relationship. The formal standard 
theoretical literature that makes attempts to provide mechanisms relating to the relationship 
between economic growth and pollution dynamics is the work by Keeler et al., (1971). In his 
model, the focus was on the interaction between capital accumulation and emission intensities 
(Brännlund et al., 2017). The link between output growth and environmental quality in their 
model is through an emission function3 , which was further developed by theoretical models (Van 
der Ploeg and Withagen,1991; Bovenberg and Smulders, 1995; Stockey, 1998). These models 
did not incorporate abatement directly and therefore were unable to comment on the direct 
pollution reduction mechanisms. Later models such as those developed by Brock and Taylor 
(2005, 2010) and Ordás Criado et al. (2011) incorporated abatement directly into the emission 
function to provide a theory with more policy relevant outcomes. The model developed by Brock 
and Taylor is based on the neoclassical Solow growth model, but extends it by incorporating 
pollution abatement via the emission function. The authors assumed that both the abatement and 
savings rates are exogenously determined. Their model indicates that growth in emissions 
depends on the initial level of emissions, saving rate, abatement intensity, population growth rate 
and the depreciation rate. On the other hand, in a Ramsey type endogenous growth model, Ordás 
Criado et al. (2011) relaxed the exogeneity of saving and abatement rates in Brock and Taylor 
and endogenised the propensity to consume and invest in clean technologies. In developing the 
model, the authors use a similar emission function to Brock and Taylor and assume that the 
individual’s utility function is affected by consumption per capita as well as pollution per capita. 
As the above indicates, a range of studies has empiricised the EKC and extended the basic model. 
Some researchers have also analysed the impact of political rights and civil liberties indices on 
 
3 The emission function assumes that productive processes generate pollution, and pollution is assumed to depend on 
output (i.e., the production process). 
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various measures of environmental quality. However, few (if any) of these studies have looked 
separately at the specific aspects of regulation and governance that are most effective in 
decreasing emissions or improving environmental quality. This is crucial if we are to draw policy- 
relevant conclusions from our analyses. This is what we turn to in this paper. 
  




Our analyses are based on data from 58 countries for 16 years (1996-2011). The data has been 
brought together from a number of sources. Data on environmental quality is from the Geo 
database of the UNEP (the UN Environmental Data Explorer). In addition, we have data on GDP 
and other economic variables from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank (2012) 
and the governance indicators are from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. This provides data 
for 201 countries in the world on several governance indicators including control of corruption, 
political stability, government effectiveness and voice and accountability. We use these indicators 
separately as there is significant variability within country across these indicators. In India, for 
instance, in 2011, the index for political stability was very low at -1.2 while that for voice and 
accountability was relatively high at +0.41, suggesting that the performance of countries across 
these indicators need not be uniform. Since each of these indicators could have very different 
impats on environmental quality, it is appropriate to analyse their impacts separately. Finally, we 
obtain data on levels of informality from Schneider et al. (2010) which is available on the World 
Bank website. We will discuss these variables later in the paper. 
 
3.2 Model and tests 
 
The model empirically tested for each of the dependent variables Yit is as follows: 
𝑌"# = 	𝑋"#' 𝛽 + (𝛼 + 𝑢") +	𝜀"#                                 (1) 
 
where, 𝛼 is the mean of unobserved heterogeneity, ui is heterogeneity specific to country i, 𝜀it is 
the remaining country-year heterogeneity, Yit is the environmental quality variable, and Xit and 𝛽 
are the matrix of explanatory variables (including log GDP per capita, sectoral characteristics, 
governance, informality of the economy etc., which are discussed later in this section) and the 
vector of coefficients respectively. 
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We estimate our model using the fixed effects instrumental variables (IV-FE)4  approach based 
on Schaffer (2012). In the fixed-effects estimations, individual country averages are subtracted 
from the annual observations and regressions on these transformed variables are performed. Thus, 
we control for individual country heterogeneities, as fixed effects are assumed constant 
throughout the observation period. 
 
Most studies of emissions of this kind face endogeneity problems. This endogeneity might arise 
both from reverse causality between environmental quality and GDP and also because of omitted 
variables in the model estimated. While GDP can be expected to influence emissions directly, 
there is the possibility (especially over time) that emissions will also influence GDP. In fact, an 
assumption that GDP is exogenous implies that we are assuming that the GDP level is fully 
sustainable. This is clearly not true for most countries, which are trying to improve the quality of 
their environment often through changes in the structure of their GDP or its size. 
 
We begin by testing for endogeneity using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) method and find 
that there is significant endogeneity in the model. To correct for this endogeneity, we need to 
instrument GDP in order to identify its coefficient. We use the age dependency ratio and its lags 
as instruments for GDP5. The age dependency ratio is correlated with GDP but does not have a 
direct effect on the dependent variable (environmental quality). The age dependency ratio is the 
ratio of dependents – people younger than 15 or older than 64 to the working age population (ages 
15-64) (World Bank 2012). It therefore captures the population that does not participate fully in 
the labour market. The larger the proportion of the population in this age group, the lower will be 
both the level of GDP and its growth. If the dependency ratio was weighted towards the younger 
age group, one would expect the country to experience high growth rates in the future due to the 
demographic transition of the young age group into an active labour force. This has been seen 
from the very high rates of growth (and significant improvement in the level of GDP) by some 
emerging economies like China and India and the other BRIC economies, which have been 
argued as having high potential for growth because they have young, working age populations6. 
 
4 Additional estimations were also performed with fixed-effects instrumental variable with lagged explanatory 
variables and limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimation methods and gave similar results. 
5 We follow Lin Lawell and Liscow, 2013 regarding the use of age dependency ratio as an instrument for GDP, but unlike 
them, we did not include debt service ratio as a valid instrument. The reason being that in our sample, debt service ratio is 
not highly correlated with GDP (-0.0169). More importantly, the correlation is statistically insignificant at any of the 
conversional significance level. 
6 Recent evidence suggests that declining youth dependency ratios in developing countries can contribute to the 
economic growth, like it did in countries like East Asia (Bloom et al. 2001; Bloom et al., 2003). 
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It is therefore expected that the age dependency ratio variable will be strongly correlated with 
both GDP growth and its level but uncorrelated with emissions. To test the exogeneity of the 
instruments, we use Hansen’s (1982) J-test. Our results indicate that the instrument is exogenous 
and therefore a good instrument for GDP. 
 
The above instrument (age dependency ratio) is employed to estimate the fixed effects-IV models, 
which help to correct not only for endogeneity but also for unobserved cross-country 
heterogeneities via the country fixed effects. In particular, it is clear that some countries are 
geographically or climatically constrained to using more energy or possibly to higher levels of 
emissions. Country fixed effects will help to capture these heterogeneities while time fixed effects 
will help to capture improvements due to technological changes or sudden weather shocks. 
Baltagi (2005) and Hahn and Whitney (2004) suggest that IV estimations can take care of the 





As indicated earlier, our model includes log GDP per capita as a measure of economic growth. 
We also include two variables relating to the structure of the economy – agriculture value added 
and industry value added. It might be expected that a high proportion of GDP being derived from 
agriculture will lead to different environmental emissions than when industry predominates. CO2 
emissions, for instance, are likely to be higher in industrial countries due to the high capital-
intensive industrial sectors of such countries relative to developing countries. In general, high 
capital-intensive sectors tend to depend heavily on fossil fuels, a key contributor to carbon 
emission. In what follows, we will discuss our variables of interest in more detail. 
 
Environmental quality and emission variables:  We analyse a range of environmental quality 
variables including Carbon Dioxide per capita as well as Carbon Dioxide per unit of energy use 
(carbon intensity), water pollution per worker and ecological footprints. 
 
Carbon-dioxide: is a primary greenhouse gas emitted through human activity. It is caused mainly 
by the combustion of fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural gas) for energy and transportation. Though 
it is part of the earth’s natural carbon cycle, we are currently emitting too much CO2,which is 
maintained in the atmosphere for 50-200 years and causes global warming (United States 
10  
Environmental Protection Agency, 2017). CO2 per capita allows for the fact that larger countries 
with large populations will have higher emissions than smaller countries simply by virtue of their 
size. CO2/energy, on the other hand, is a measure of the emission intensity in terms of carbon 
emission per unit of energy used. This is likely to depend on the structure of production as well 
as on how efficient and clean the production processes in the economy are. 
 
Water Pollution per worker: is the total emission of organic water pollutants, which is divided by 
the number of industrial workers. Organic water pollutants are measured by biochemical oxygen 
demand, which refers to the amount of oxygen that bacteria in water will consume. 
 
Water Pollution (Chemical): arises from metals and solvents from industrial work, from 
pesticides and fertilizers used in agriculture and from petroleum spillages. Given the nature of 
the pollutants and the emissions, it is likely to be more local than CO2 or NO2 emissions, for 
instance. 
 
Ecological footprint: The Ecological Footprint is a measure of the consumption of renewable 
natural resources by a human population, be it that of a country, a region or the whole world. A 
population's ecological footprint is the total area of productive land or sea required to produce. 
 
Informal Economy: We analyse the role of regulation in governance by considering both the 
impact that the informal economy has on emissions as well as the impact of specific governance 
indicators. The International Labour Organisation defines the 'informal economy' as all economic 
activities by workers and economic units that are – in law or in practice – not covered or 
insufficiently covered by formal arrangements”7. In this paper, we use the data provided by 
Schneider et al. (2010) as a measure of the informal economy. This measure includes all market- 
based legal production of goods and services that are deliberately concealed from public 
authorities to avoid payment of income, value added or other taxes; payment of social security 
contributions; compliance with certain legal labor market standards, such as minimum wages, 
maximum working hours, safety standards, etc.; and compliance with certain administrative 
procedures, such as completing statistical questionnaires or administrative forms. Based on this 
definition, they calculate a measure of the informal economy for 162 countries for the years 1999-
 
7 Their activities are not included in the law, which means that they are operating outside the formal reach of the law; or 
they are not covered in practice, which means that – although they are operating within the formal reach of the law, the law 
is not applied or not enforced; or the law discourages compliance because it is inappropriate, burdensome, or imposes excessive 
costs." 
11  
2006. They allow for a number of indicators of the informal economy including intensity of 
regulations (which also includes regulatory quality from the World Governance Indicators), 
public sector services (including government effectiveness from the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators), GDP, unemployment rate, openness, tax and social security burdens, labour market 
indicators as well as the use of cash in the economy as opposed to bank accounts etc. These 
measures are then brought together using a Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) 
methodology to construct the informal variable (indicator) (Schneider et al, 2010). 
 
Governance Variables: In addition to the broad informal economy variable discussed above, we 
also estimate our model separately with four governance indicators from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators data created by Kaufman et al., (2010). These variables range from -2.5 
(weak governance) to +2.5 (strong). 
 
Voice and Accountability: reflects the perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are 
able to participate in selecting their government as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association and a free media. We might expect that the stronger this is, the lower will be emissions 
because there is room for public opinion to influence and constrain the  actions of big business, 
industry and policy maker, given that the consequences of the emissions are directly felt by the 
population. The importance of this indicator is being felt everyday by the impact that individuals 
like Greta Thunberg or interest groups like Extinction Rebellion have had on economic agents as 
well as government policy. However, much will depend upon the public opinion itself. It is 
entirely possible that public opinion is skewed in favour of increased economic activity whatever 
the cost to the environment. Having said this, it seems likely that high levels of voice and 
accountability enable a range of opinions to be expressed and therefore are less likely to simply 
lead to increased emissions. 
 
Government effectiveness: is the quality and competence of public services and civil service 
provision, independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government in implementing formulated policies. 
 
Political Stability/No Violence: reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including political terrorism and 
violence. Again, it ranges between +/- 2.5. It is unclear how this will work. Countries which are 
experiencing conflict or political violence are unlikely to be able to legislate in favour of 
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environmental quality or to enforce the regulations that already exist. They are also unlikely to 
protect common property or invest in common resources as various groups in the conflict vie for 
larger shares in these resources.  
 
Control of Corruption: reflects the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and 
private interests. This could allow rents to be captured by strong private agents and much less 
likelihood of the social costs of production being reflected either in the prices or the tax regimes. 
Other variables included in our analysis are energy use per capita, which is total energy use as a 
ratio of the population, trade i.e. exports plus imports expressed as a ratio of GDP, and the  age 
dependency ratio. 
 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the analysis and shows 
that on average nearly one-third (32.6 percent) of the economy is in the informal sector. 
Moreover, the descriptive statistics indicate a significant variability in the key variables across 
the countries in the data set as depicted by the standard deviation values. 
 





We begin by estimating the reduced form model of the impact of the informal economy on the 
emission of pollutants, after controlling for log GDP per capita. In all estimations, we log 
transformed  all  the variables before estimation for two reasons. First, the log transformation 
helps to reduce outlier effects. And second, it makes it easy to achieve normality of the random 
error term of our IV-fixed effect model. Note that all the governance indicators range from -2.5 
to +2.5 and therefore in order to apply the log transformation, we rescaled them to be positive. 
Our analysis follows three steps. First, we estimate the reduced-form model as presented in 
equation (1), where we focus on the role of the informal sector on the five different pollutants in 
our dataset. Next, we estimate a reduced form model as presented in equation (1), but we replace 
the informal sector variable with four different governance indicators, to assess the effect of each 
governance indicator on each of the five pollutants. In the final step, we divide our sample into 
two sub-samples – the OCED and the non-OECD countries. Given that these groups of countries 
13  
are at different levels of development, we might expect their economic structure and institutions 
to be significantly different from each other. Separating out the sub-samples allows us to consider 
if there is a discontinuity in the slope of the relationship across these groups of countries.  
 
The results for the first step are presented in Table 2 and show that the larger is the informal 
economy, the higher are local pollutants (water-pollutants per worker, water-pollutants per 
chemical and the ecological footprint). However, the informal sector has no significant effect on 
global pollutants such as carbon emission per capita and carbon intensity. This is consistent with 
the finding by Hettige et al. (1996), where plants located in urban /industrial clusters that operated 
invisibly had a negative impact on pollution abatement. This is not surprising, given that across 
large parts of the world, the informal economy is seen to encourage the use of wood fuels and 
farming practices that lead to the reduction in the ecological footprint. Economies with a larger 
informal sector also tend to contribute more to water pollution because activities from the 
informal sector are not easy to track and regulate. Informal mining activities, for instance, where 
various chemicals are used to wash the minerals and the wastewater is dumped into rivers and 
other water bodies contribute to water pollution. Finally, our results above indicate that, after 
controlling for GDP per capita, the informal economy significantly increases the organic water 
pollutants per industrial worker and water pollution from chemicals. Again, this result is not 
surprising because organic and chemical water pollutants are likely to be more common and less 
regulated in the informal and relatively small-scale sectors (Hettige et al., 1996). Their impact on 
water pollution is therefore likely to be more obvious than their impact on air quality, which is a 
global ‘bad’. 
 
The informal sector also leads to a greater demand on the Ecological Footprint (which gauges the 
total area of productive land or sea required to produce). Our results for the informal sector are 
reinforced by the fact that CO2 emissions are higher in urban economies and in economies with 
a higher use of energy resources. 
 
< Table 2 about here> 
 
It is also important to note that, controls such as urbanization have a positive effect on global 
pollutants such as CO2 per capita emission and CO2 intensity, which is consistent with the finding 
by Biswas et al., (2012). Urbanisation, however, has a negative effect on local pollutants, where 
the negative effect is statistically significant for both chemical water pollution and the ecological 
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footprint, with elasticity values of -0.98 and -0.68, respectively. GDP per capita has a positive 
effect on all pollutants, with the effect being significant in the case of CO2 per capita, chemical 
water pollutants and the ecological footprint. 
 
Furthermore, it is useful to consider why one might expect the informal economy to influence the 
level of pollution. This might happen for a number of reasons. First, a large informal sector might 
skew the structure of the economy in the direction of certain sectors (e.g. services) that are more 
likely to be informal (and less likely to pollute). If this were the case, we might expect the informal 
economy to have a negative impact on pollution. Second, the informal sector may use different 
types of fuel or less fuel than the formal sector. If the former, then it is likely to contribute to 
increased pollution but if the latter, then it may actually decrease pollution. There are a number 
of studies that argue that the use of wood fired kilns in the informal sector actually increases the 
pollution contribution of this sector rather than reduces it. Finally, the informal sector is so termed 
because it is less regulated than the formal sector. This implies that its activities face fewer 
constraints in terms of legislation against pollution, taxes to reduce pollution etc. and in this case 
we might expect it to have an increased impact on pollution.  Note that while the first and third 
factors would influence both air and water pollution, the second factor is only likely to be 
significant for air pollution. 
 
In the reduced form version of the model that we consider in Table 2 (also see appendix), we are 
unable to separate out these effects. As a consequence, in the second step, we re-estimate the 
model, in particular including a range of governance variables, which   helps us determine 
whether the effect of the informal sector relates to the lack of governance associated with it or to 
some other factors. The variables we include are control of corruption, political stability, 
government effectiveness and voice and accountability. The results based on the second step 
estimation are presented in Table 3. 
 
Our results indicate that, for CO2 emissions per capita, the higher is GDP per capita, the higher 
is the per capita CO2 emissions. This is typical of the scale effect which asserts that growing 
economic activity leads to increased environmental damage as more resources are required for 
increasing production (Brock and Taylor, 2005).  Thus, the more prosperous an economy, the 
higher is its CO2 emissions per capita. This finding is consistent with previous literature (Biswas 
et al., 2012; Gani, 2012; Elgin  and  Oztunali, 2014). We control for both industry value added 
and urbanization and therefore the coefficient of GDP per capita is conditional on these. This 
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positive effect of GDP per capita is consistent for all pollutants, it is however insignificant in the 
case of water pollutants. 
 
Amongst the governance variables, we find control of corruption to have a negative significant 
effect on four of the five pollutants. It is insignificant only in the case of ecological footprint. This 
confirms that among other things, the control of corruption reduces CO2 per capita, organic and 
chemical water-pollutants per worker. Thus, after controlling for level of GDP per capita, an 
economy with lower corruption (fewer irregular payments, less public funds diverted, more trust 
in politicians etc.) has lower CO2 pollution as well as water pollution. This finding is in line with 
Brännlund et al., (2015), where they find a negative effect of corruption on CO2 per capita 
emission for a global sample. Also, Gani (2012) found a negative effect of control of corruption 
on both CO2 per capita emission and CO2 intensity amongst developing countries. 
 
The results also indicate that political stability has a positive effect on global pollutants, but a 
negative effect on local pollutants. Specifically, it increases CO2 per capita and CO2 intensity 
(contrary to the finding in Gani, 2012), whereas it decreases chemical water pollutants and the 
ecological footprint. This might relate to the fact that economies that are more politically stable 
have better established manufacturing sectors, which will increase the CO2 emissions. It will 
decrease chemical water pollution because in such economies it is easier enforce regulations. The 
difference in our findings for CO2 per capita and CO2 intensity, as compared to Gani (2012), may 
be due to the fact that we considered both the developed and the developing countries. Gani, on 
the other hand focused only on developing countries, where conflict is more common. This will 
be further examined in the final step of our estimation strategy. 
 
Finally, we investigate voice and accountability and government effectiveness. We find that both 
CO2 per capita and CO2 intensity respond positively to increases in voice and accountability, with 
estimated elasticities of 0.09 and 0.09, respectively. Government effectiveness has a marginally 
significant negative effect only on organic water pollutants. While it might have been expected 
that an effective government would decrease all types of pollution, this assumes that decreasing 
pollution is one of the government’s priorities.  
 
< Table 3 about here> 
 
16  
We can see from these results that the single most consistent governance factor is the control of 
corruption. The other governance factors – political stability and voice and accountability – have 
variable effects which will be further investigated in our sub-sample analysis. The role of the 
informal sector on pollutant emissions is likely to differ across countries at different stages of 
development, partly due to the differences in economic structure and the quality of institutions 
that can enforce environmental laws. We considered two different sub-samples, the OECD 
sample and the  non-OECD sample. These results are presented in Table 4 and Table 5, 
respectively. The results indicate that our key variable of interest (informal sector) has a negative 
significant impact on global pollutants (CO2 per capita and CO2 intensity), in the OECD sample 
whereas it has no significant effect on these pollutants in the non-OECD sample. This is not 
surprising because the OECD sample is likely to have more services in the informal sector. On 
the other hand, while there is no significant impact of informality on the water pollutants in the 
OECD sample, there is a strong positive impact on these pollutants in the non-OECD sub-sample. 
 
The difference in the effect of the informal sector between the two sub-samples maybe explained 
by the difference in the general structure of the economy and the kind of economic activities the 
informal sector engages in (Elgin and Oztunali, 2014). For instance, the informal sector in 
developing countries is  likely to engage predominantly in activities such as subsistence farming, 
fishing and services. These activities may contribute more to local pollutants such as water 
pollution rather than carbon emissions due to both the low capital-intensive and rudimentary 
technologies that are adopted in this sector. 
 
An interesting finding from the sub-sample analysis is with respect to GDP per capita.  In the 
OECD sample it is negative for four of the pollutants, whereas, in the case of the non-OECD 
sample, it is positive for all the five pollutants. Specifically, in the OECD sample, GDP per capita 
has a significant negative impact on CO2 intensity and water pollutant per worker. This suggests 
that for these two pollutants, there is decoupling of GDP from emission that could come through 
stringent environmental laws and enforcements, new technology that is less polluting and 
efficient use of resources such as energy at a certain stage of development and effectiveness of 
governance institutions. It also does seem to confirm the EKC pattern that pollution decreases 
with income in more prosperous countries. In the case of the non-OECD sample, the results 
indicate no evidence of decoupling of GDP per capita from emissions. Thus, the determinants of 




Based on these findings from the sub-sample analysis, we also examine the impact of each of our 
governance indicators on the various pollutants. The results from this analysis are reported in the 
appendix (Table A1). We find that the governance indicators are clearly more significant in the 
non-OECD sample than in the  OECD sample. More specifically, for the OECD countries, 
political stability is not significant for any indicator and government effectiveness is only 
significant at the 10 per cent level for CO2 per capita and the ecological footprint. The only two 
cases where governance is significant is the impact of control of corruption on organic water 
pollutants and voice and accountability. For OECD countries, voice and accountability decreases 
chemical water pollutant but marginally increases the ecological footprint.   
 
For the non-OECD countries, both political stability and control of corruption are highly 
significant for 4 out of the 5 indicators. Control of corruption decreases both CO2 indicators and 
water pollutants. It marginally increases the  ecological footprint. Political stability increases CO2 
emissions but decreases water pollutants and the ecological footprint. Voice and accountability 
increases CO2 emissions, whereas government effectiveness is largely insignificant but has a 
weak impact on decreasing water pollutant per worker. 
 
< Table 4 about here> 
 
< Table 5 about here> 
 
4.1 Sensitivity  Analysis 
 
In order to check the robustness of our results, we conduct the following sensitivity analysis. 
First, by ignoring the potential endogeneity of GDP per capita and estimating the reduced-form 
model by a fixed effect approach. Second, by replacing the informal sector variable with a second 
proxy, constructed from the first principal components of both government effectiveness and 
regulatory quality (referred to as informal). These variables (government effectiveness and 
regularity quality) are directly linked to the size of the informal sector. A country with a lax 
regulatory environment and an ineffective government is likely to have a large proportion of its 
economic activities operating in the informal sector relative to a country with a better developed 
regulatory environment and an effective government. We therefore expect an inverse relationship 
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between these two factors (government effectiveness and regularity quality) and the size of the 
informal sector. 
 
The results for the first sensitivity analysis based on the full sample both for the cases where 
regulation is represented with informal sector and where it is represented with four different 
dimensions of governance are reported in the appendix (Table A3). In general, the results are 
qualitatively similar to our main results for the full sample reported in tables 2 and 3, respectively 
for the case of the informal sector and that of governance. The estimated elasticity of pollution 
with respect to the informal sector is positive and significant for all the local pollutants except the 
case of the ecological footprint, where the sign of the coefficient changes from positive to 
negative. In the case of governance indicators, once again, the results are largely similar though 
the level of potential significance of the coefficients varies. This does suggest potential bias on 
the estimated coefficients due to endogeneity of GDP in the fixed effect model relative to the IV- 
model. 
 
The results for the second sensitivity analysis based on the full sample using the constructed 
proxy for the informal sector (informal2), reported in the appendix (Table A4) are qualitatively 
similar to our main results. They indicate that informal2 has a positive impact on the global 
pollutants and negative impact on the local pollutants (except in the case of ecological footprint). 
However, the magnitude and significance, of this new construct of informality vary as compared 
to the original index for the informal sector, which includes factors beyond regulation and 
government effectiveness. 
 
We find that our results are robust to both endogeneity and the measure of the informal sector 
(broad or narrow measure). The quantitative differences in the magnitude of the estimates, can 
be attributed to the endogeneity and the measurement bias. 
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The objective of this study is to provide a clear understanding of the effect of the informal sector 
and the quality of governance on a range of pollutants. The intent is to present empirical evidence 
on the role of the informal sector on emissions and whether this is conditional on the type of 
pollutant and the level of a country’s development. In addition to assessing the causal effects of 
the informal sector, we are also interested in investigating the governance mechanisms that 
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influence environmental quality, namely, control of corruption, political stability, voice and 
accountability and government effectiveness. The empirical analysis is based on a panel data 
consisting of 58 countries and 16 years. 
 
Several interesting findings emerge. First, in general the informal sector tends to positively 
influence the local pollutants emission but has no significant impact on the global pollutants such 
as CO2 per capita and CO2 intensity. Given that most activities in the informal sector rely heavily 
on labour-intensive production techniques (Managi et al., 2009), especially in the developing 
countries, our results suggest that the consequences of such techniques on CO2 emission would 
be small due to the low energy utilisation of such techniques. In the case of the OECD countries, 
it is likely that the impact of the informal sector may be negative for such global pollutants, due 
to the low-capital intensive nature of production activity in the informal sector  relative to the 
formal sector. In addition, OECD countries have better institutions for monitoring and regulating 
pollution. Second, we find evidence for the impact of four specific governance variables on 
pollutant emissions. In particular, the control of corruption has a negative effect on pollutant 
emissions, irrespective of the global or local nature of the pollutant. Political stability on the other 
hand has a positive impact on global pollutants but a negative impact on local pollutants. Voice 
and accountability has a significant positive effect on global pollutants. 
 
These results have implications for policy-making, especially in the non-OECD countries. First, 
control of corruption is clearly a significant factor improving environmental quality especially in 
the non-OECD countries.  Thus, environmental policy in the non-OECD countries should focus 
on  improving the institutions of governance that help control corruption and improve 
governance. Secondly, the GDP per capita had a negative effect on pollutants emission for the 
OECD countries, suggests that over the sampled period, OECD countries have to a certain extent 
succeeded in decoupling economic activities from energy use and consequently pollution. In 
contrast, the non-OECD countries show increase in pollutant emission with increasing economic 
growth. Non-OECD countries lack stringent environmental controls and implementation of 
incentive-based environmental policies, especially in their informal sector. The non-OECD 
countries will benefit from improving their institutions to ensure good monitoring and regulation 
of pollution. 
 
Our results provide insights into the role of informal sector and governance on pollutant emission, 
thereby providing environmental policy direction for countries with a significant size of the 
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informal sector.  Environmental pollution controls in countries with poor governance institutions 
are weak. The efficacy of an environmental policy for any country with a huge informal sector 
will be low unless efforts are made to regulate the informal sector (i.e. to formalise it). To the 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Informal sector 32.644 12.593 8.100 68.300 
Agriculture value added 14.832 13.378 0.034 62.383 
Industry value added 29.928 12.881 5.394 95.708 
Population density 254.222 1308.201 0.136 17703.500 
Urbanisation 55.403 24.103 7.418 100.000 
Energy use per capita 2397.966 2854.619 9.021 23599.080 
Trade 88.352 47.558 0.000 460.471 
Age dependency ratio 63.677 18.041 16.926 113.908 
Carbon-dioxide per capita 4.905 6.800 0.013 68.626 
Carbon-dioxide intensity 2.215 0.926 0.163 6.141 
Water pollutant per worker 0.186 0.059 0.091 0.451 
Water pollutant 10.829 5.118 0.334 55.907 
Ecological footprint 2.801 2.027 0.437 12.195 
Control Corruption 0.426 0.222 0.001 1.000 
Political Stability 0.627 0.188 0.001 1.000 
Voice & Accountability 0.554 0.246 0.001 1.000 
Government Effectiveness 0.504 0.205 0.001 1.000 
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Table 2: Impact of Informal Sector on pollution, IV- GMM- FE estimations 
 
 Ln CO2 per 
capita 










Ln GDP per 
capita 0.407
** 0.212 0.0919 0.799*** 0.792*** 
 (0.158) (0.152) (0.0894) (0.287) (0.208) 
Ln informal 
sector -0.0905 -0.281 0.773
*** 2.469*** 0.940* 
 (0.390) (0.400) (0.294) (0.942) (0.522) 
Ln Agric value 
added 0.0170 0.0280 -0.0465
** 0.0700 0.0394 
 (0.0244) (0.0261) (0.0200) (0.0632) (0.0336) 
Ln industry 
value added -0.0445 -0.0782
* 0.0409 -0.479*** 0.0716 
 (0.0408) (0.0435) (0.0377) (0.121) (0.0618) 
Ln population 
density 0.508
*** 0.488*** 0.0867 0.780** 0.344 
 (0.177) (0.186) (0.0961) (0.308) (0.234) 
Ln urbanisation 0.560*** 0.252 -0.106 -0.978* -0.676*** 
 (0.168) (0.183) (0.146) (0.505) (0.227) 
Ln energy use 0.591***  0.0595 -0.105 0.225*** 
 (0.0523)  (0.0368) (0.117) (0.0715) 
Ln trade 0.0428 0.0127 -0.0340 0.196*** -0.0353 
 (0.0289) (0.0295) (0.0223) (0.0704) (0.0403) 
Sample size 1016 1016 490 473 935 
Hanson-j stat 7.894 4.813 2.821 4.278 8.034 
P-value (0.048) (0.090) (0.244) (0.118) (0.018) 
Anderson 100.8 114.1 129.8 120.9 97.61 
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cragg Donald F- 
stats 26.10 39.78 49.47 45.76 33.78 
Standard errors in parentheses, yes denote time dummies are included in the model, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 3: Impact of Governance on Pollution, IV- GMM- FE estimations 
 
 Ln CO2 per 
capita 










Ln GDP per capita 0.290** 0.290** 0.018 0.386 0.695*** 
 (0.133) (0.133) (0.080) (0.284) (0.218) 
Ln Agric value added -0.014 -0.014 -0.031 -0.029 0.067 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.066) (0.041) 
Ln industry value 
added 
0.026 0.026 0.042 -0.159 0.050 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.040) (0.156) (0.060) 
Ln population density 0.474*** 0.474*** 0.058 0.464 0.224 
 (0.141) (0.141) (0.139) (0.452) (0.225) 
Ln urbanisation 0.481*** 0.481*** -0.116 -1.144** -0.304 
 (0.145) (0.145) (0.144) (0.495) (0.235) 
Ln energy use 0.719*** -0.281*** 0.038 0.033 0.249*** 
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.036) (0.117) (0.087) 
Ln trade 0.072*** 0.072*** -0.033 0.035 -0.069* 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.075) (0.040) 
Ln Control 
corruption 
-0.098*** -0.098*** -0.048* -0.375*** 0.065 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.092) (0.042) 
Ln Political Stability 0.103*** 0.103*** -0.014 -0.288*** -0.082* 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.096) (0.045) 
Ln Voice & 
Accountability 0.090
*** 0.090*** 0.016 0.058 0.008 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.022) (0.071) (0.043) 
Ln Government 
effectiveness 
0.071 0.071 -0.103* -0.275 -0.059 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.054) (0.190) (0.111) 
Sample size 1138 1138 441 418 910 
Hanson-j stat 6.832 6.832 2.584 3.504 5.006 
P-value 0.032 0.0328 0.275 0.173 0.0818 
Anderson 88.09 88.09 113.1 88.93 67.86 
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cragg Donald F-stats 30.05 30.05 41.69 31.81 23.02 




Table 4: Impact of Informal Sector on pollution, IV- GMM- FE estimations-OECD 
 
 Ln CO2 per 
capita 










Ln GDP per capita -0.175 -0.262* -0.552** -0.434 0.509* 
 (0.138) (0.141) (0.214) (0.335) (0.266) 
Ln informal sector -0.584** -0.671** 0.167 -1.161 -0.315 
 (0.279) (0.295) (0.499) (0.779) (0.521) 
Ln Agric value 
added 0.0124 0.0124 -0.0689
* -0.204*** -0.00878 
 (0.0269) (0.0271) (0.0366) (0.0571) (0.0483) 
Ln industry value 
added -0.0387 -0.0571 -0.169
* -0.317** 0.167* 
 (0.0532) (0.0527) (0.0982) (0.153) (0.0955) 
Ln population 
density -0.0140 -0.143 0.285 -0.388 -0.684
* 
 (0.203) (0.191) (0.287) (0.448) (0.365) 
Ln urbanisation -0.00275 -0.0701 0.158 -0.551 -0.412 
 (0.243) (0.246) (0.342) (0.533) (0.441) 
Ln energy use 0.874***  0.491*** 0.204 0.277* 
 (0.0682)  (0.117) (0.183) (0.141) 
Ln trade -0.0375 -0.0555 -0.0288 -0.0421 -0.0386 
 (0.0423) (0.0415) (0.0530) (0.0827) (0.0755) 
Sample size 257 257 188 188 248 
Hanson-j stat 1.336 0.679 11.64 4.161 2.028 
P-value (0.721) (0.712) (0.003) (0.125) (0.363) 
Anderson 158.1 126.9 100.1 100.1 121.8 
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cragg Donald F- 
stats 52.26 52.38 43.23 43.23 49.78 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 5: Impact of Informal Sector on pollution, IV- GMM- FE estimations-Non-OECD 
 
 Ln CO2 per 
capita 










Ln GDP per 
capita 0.541
** 0.519* 0.214** 1.209*** 1394*** 
 (0.274) (0.292) (0.0995) (0.398) (0.398) 
Ln informal 
sector 0.168 0.344 0.978
*** 3.904*** 2.364** 
 (0.644) (0.708) (0.348) (1.392) (0.945) 
Ln Agric value 
added 0.0305 0.0696 -0.0266 0.189
* 0.111* 
 (0.0380) (0.0433) (0.0253) (0.0999) (0.0587) 
Ln industry 
value added -0.0590 -0.0916
* 0.0591 -0.527*** 0.0860 
 (0.0495) (0.0528) (0.0432) (0.176) (0.0854) 
Ln population 
density 0.643
** 0.895** 0.143 0.911** 1.189** 
 (0.324) (0.370) (0.104) (0.424) (0.470) 
Ln urbanisation 0.542** 0.106 -0.283* -1.077 -0.862*** 
 (0.217) (0.248) (0.164) (0.735) (0.320) 
Ln energy use 0.552***  -0.00242 -0.118 0.176* 
 (0.0653)  (0.0376) (0.150) (0.0975) 
Ln trade 0.0611* 0.0320 -0.0232 0.251** -0.00680 
 (0.0362) (0.0370) (0.0246) (0.0982) (0.0573) 
Sample size 759 759 302 285 687 
Hansen-j stat 5.833 3.611 0.980 6.253 2.939 
P-value 0.120 0.164 0.613 0.0439 0.230 
Anderson 35.73 33.88 76.61 70.93 35.10 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Cragg Donald F- 
stats 8.916 11.29 28.57 26.31 11.69 






Table A1: Governance impact, OECD sample 
 










Ln GDP per capita 0.022 -0.103 -0.462* -0.259 0.212 
 (0.171) (0.168) (0.244) (0.434) (0.268) 
Ln Agric value 
added -0.021 -0.011 0.021 -0.223
*** -0.009 
 (0.031) (0.033) (0.044) (0.079) (0.049) 
Ln industry value 
added 0.112
* 0.041 -0.203** -0.312* 0.260*** 
 (0.058) (0.060) (0.099) (0.177) (0.091) 
Ln population 
density 0.068 -0.445
* 0.074 0.298 -0.931** 
 (0.263) (0.243) (0.353) (0.628) (0.394) 
Ln urbanisation 0.528 0.387 -0.056 -0.578 -0.684 
 (0.340) (0.354) (0.463) (0.825) (0.509) 
Ln energy use 0.614***  0.369*** 0.060 0.419*** 
 (0.080)  (0.117) (0.208) (0.143) 
Ln trade -0.074 -0.136** -0.083 0.083 -0.158* 
 (0.052) (0.054) (0.082) (0.147) (0.080) 
Ln Control of 
corruption -0.040 -0.064 -0.227
** 0.136 -0.036 
 (0.077) (0.083) (0.087) (0.156) (0.108) 
Ln Political stability -0.0004 -0.017 0.064 0.044 -0.081 
 (0.072) (0.077) (0.089) (0.160) (0.105) 
Ln Voice & 
accountability 0.002 0.076 -0.133 -0.590
** 0.270* 
 (0.111) (0.120) (0.144) (0.256) (0.159) 
Ln Government 
Effectiveness 0.175
* 0.146 -0.143 0.257 0.272* 
 (0.100) (0.108) (0.139) (0.247) (0.143) 
Sample size 256 256 163 163 220 
Hanson-j stat 2.564 0.552 6.023 2.226 8.392 
P-value 0.278 0.759 0.049 0.329 0.015 
Anderson 92.88 96.78 60.36 60.36 75.55 
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cragg Donald F- 
stats 
 
34.72 36.68 21.76 21.76 27.64 







Table A2: Governance effect on NON-OECD sample 
 










Ln GDP per capita 0.251 0.176 0.160 0.467 1.338** 
 (0.250) (0.246) (0.120) (0.514) (0.521) 
Ln Agric value 
added -0.021 -0.015 -0.024 0.030 0.183
** 
 (0.041) (0.044) (0.025) (0.101) (0.093) 
Ln industry value 
added -0.002 -0.038 0.024 -0.076 0.059 
 (0.042) (0.044) (0.050) (0.252) (0.083) 
Ln population 
density 0.430 0.517
* 0.265 0.518 1.010* 
 (0.273) (0.305) (0.204) (0.855) (0.551) 
Ln urbanisation 0.388** 0.099 -0.213 -1.609** -0.169 
 (0.173) (0.176) (0.157) (0.681) (0.326) 
Ln energy use 0.741***  0.002 0.069 0.144 
 (0.074)  (0.037) (0.148) (0.141) 
Ln trade 0.087*** 0.078** -0.038 0.018 -0.078 
 (0.030) (0.031) (0.025) (0.099) (0.056) 
Ln Control of 
corruption -0.099
*** -0.113*** -0.016 -0.438*** 0.104* 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.029) (0.122) (0.059) 
Ln Political stability 0.114*** 0.127*** -0.026 -0.305** -0.123* 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.032) (0.127) (0.068) 
Ln Voice & 
accountability 0.091
*** 0.089** 0.020 0.072 0.044 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.023) (0.090) (0.065) 
Ln Government 
Effectiveness 0.072 0.082 -0.114
* -0.421 -0.305 
 (0.106) (0.109) (0.060) (0.272) (0.215) 
Sample size 882 882 278 255 690 
Hanson-j stat 5.522 6.459 0.743 4.200 2.206 
P-value 0.063 0.039 0.690 0.122 0.332 
Anderson 26.63 27.32 40.15 31.86 16.82 
P-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Cragg Donald F- 
stats 8.784 9.028 13.35 10.38 5.495 









Table A3: Fixed effect regression results for informal and governance models  
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
           Informal    Governance   






































0.441*** 0.310*** 0.190*** 0.341** 0.130** 0.373*** 0.285*** 0.143** 0.146 0.179** 




-0.0133 -0.0430 0.897*** 1.194* -0.577**      




0.019 0.037 -0.041** 0.059 -0.014 0.029 0.035 -0.013 -0.026 0.043 





-0.046 -0.086** 0.017 -0.354*** 0.118** 0.078 0.042 0.004 0.110 0.091 




0.538*** 0.584*** 0.167 0.509 -0.233 0.562*** 0.607*** 0.233 0.425 -0.056 




0.549*** 0.197 -0.0885 -1.057** -0.485** 0.370 0.0523 -0.092 -1.231 -0.362 
 (0.160) (0.165) (0.150) (0.515) (0.207) (0.266) (0.283) (0.190) (1.139) (0.314) 
Ln energy 
use 
0.584***  0.0370 -0.0231 0.366*** 0.688***  0.016 -0.099 0.456*** 
 (0.042)  (0.034) (0.109) (0.054) (0.112)  (0.036) (0.174) (0.131) 
Ln trade 0.0452* 0.0187 -0.0214 0.148** -0.088** 0.073* 0.063 -0.034 -0.011 -0.142* 




     -0.080 -0.085 -0.018 -0.351 -0.031 




     0.082* 0.096* -0.044 -0.433** -0.033 





     0.063 0.055 0.034 0.026 -0.023 






     0.152* 0.151 -0.138** -0.071 0.207* 
      (0.085) (0.095) (0.057) (0.309) (0.115) 
Constant -11.26*** -4.753*** -6.740*** -1.639 2.080 -11.13*** -4.539*** -3.549*** 4.113 -1.83 
 (1.196) (1.259) (1.121) (3.603) (1.542) (1.211) (1.224) (1.018) (3.749) (1.162) 






Table A4: IV- GMM- FE regression results for a new informal sector index (informal2) 
 
 Ln CO2 per 
capita 










Ln GDP per capita 0.194 0.0839 0.0249 0.352 0.690*** 
 (0.120) (0.111) (0.0788) (0.287) (0.191) 
Ln informal2 0.0390* 0.0417* -0.0398** -0.138** 0.0163 
 (0.0217) (0.0222) (0.0157) (0.0555) (0.0342) 
Ln Agric value 
added 
-0.0269 -0.0248 -0.0337 -0.0141 0.0760** 
 (0.0242) (0.0251) (0.0204) (0.0688) (0.0386) 
Ln industry value 
added 
0.0420 0.00939 0.0341 -0.197 0.0391 
 (0.0379) (0.0400) (0.0409) (0.160) (0.0611) 
Ln population 
density 
0.385*** 0.417*** 0.0306 0.469 0.241 
 (0.131) (0.138) (0.128) (0.438) (0.203) 
Ln urbanisation 0.511*** 0.238 -0.104 -0.933* -0.282 
 (0.149) (0.149) (0.144) (0.526) (0.237) 
Ln energy use 0.731***  0.0358 0.0124 0.241*** 
 (0.0529)  (0.0367) (0.126) (0.0814) 
Ln trade 0.0729*** 0.0630** -0.0258 0.0976 -0.0596 
 (0.0259) (0.0266) (0.0232) (0.0785) (0.0402) 
Sample size 1139 1139 441 418 910 
Hanson-j stat 6.870 6.145 1.534 4.323 5.006 
P-value 0.0322 0.0463 0.464 0.115 0.0818 
Anderson 108.2 127.7 110.2 88.75 85.68 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Cragg Donald F- 
stats 
37.43 44.65 40.81 32.02 29.52 
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
